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RECENT CASES
AGENCY-IMPUTED LIABILITY-LOAN OF AUTOMOBILES. The defendant, a
teacher in an Idaho high school, on the day preceding a football game
to be played at a neighboring town, asked the coach if he had enough
cars to transport the team, and upon being informed that he needed
one more car, defendant told the coach that he might use her car if
he drove it himself. No compensation was requested and none was received. While the coach was driving the car next day en route to the
game, he was killed and the plaintiff, one of the players, was injured.
Admitting negligence on the part of the coach and no contributory
negligence on plaintiff's part, the court held defendant liable in a suit
for personal injuries brought against her by the plaintiff on the ground
that the coach was the agent of the defendant. Gorton v. Doty, 69 P. (2d)
136 (Ida., 1937).

The soundness of the decision may be questioned for the reason that
the facts do not warrant the application of the rule announced. The
court stated and applied the rule that, "agency is the relationship which
results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 1. See: Sullivan
v. Finch, 140 Kan. 399, 36 P. (2d) 1023 (1934); Georgeson. v. Neilsen,
24 Wis. 191, 252 N. W. 576 (1934). The finding that the coach was
defendant's agent presents a too liberal interpretation of the rule, for
agency requires that the agent be acting for and in behalf of his principal. 2 C. J. 419; State v. Hubbard, 58 Kan. 791, 51 Pac. 290 (1897)
Steele v. Lawyer, 47 Wash. 266, 91 Pac. 958 (1907).
According to the rule applied and the great weight of authority there
must be a showing that the agent was acting for and in the behalf of
his principal. See cases cited supra. From the evidence in the instant
case the Idaho court has traveled a long distance to find this relationship.
If there was a benefit from the loan of the car it appears that the
benefit accrued to the coach or to the school district rather than to the
defendant, thus making the coach or the school district the gratuitous
bailee of loaned property and exonerating the defendant from liability.
Accordingly, in Packard-Louisville Motor Co. v. O'Neal, 248 Ky. 438, 58
S. W. (2d) 630 (1933), where the owner gratuitously loaned a car for a
funeral, it was held that the owner was not liable for the driver's
negligence. Also, in Sharples v. Watson, 157 Miss. 236, 127 So. 779 (1930),
where the owner gratuitously permitted a student to take the owner's
daughter and others to a track meet, the owner was held not liable for
the driver's negligence.
Specifying the driver who is to operate the car tends to show neither
that it is on the owner's behalf nor that the driver is under his control.
In a case where the owner loaned his car to a driver with the understanding that the owner's son should make the trip the owner was held
not liable for the driver's negligence. Culpepper v. Holmes, 170 Miss. 235,
154 So. 726 (1934). See also: Gochee v. Wagner, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E.
553 (1931); Marsh v. Sasanof], 9 N. J. Misc. 545, 154 Atl. 751 (1930);
Benlle v. Taylor, 202 Ala. 305, 80 So. 370 (1918); Braverman v. Hart,
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105 N. Y. S. 107 (1907); Limbacher v. Faunon, 102 Misc. Rep. 703, 169
N. Y. S. 490 (1918); Jones u. Harris, 122 Wash. 69, 168 Pac. 863 (1917),
L. R. A. 1918D, 498.
Thus the majority of courts follow the rule as illustrated in the
above cases, and hold that in the absence of liability imposed by statute,
the owner of an automobile is not liable for the negligence of the party
to whom the property is loaned, when using it upon an enterprise of his
own. It would seem that the use of an automobile under conditions as
in the instant case creates a gratuitous bailment rather than an agency
relationship. It is accordingly submitted that the case is erroneously
decided and the transaction should have been considered a gratuitous
bailment of the automobile rather than an agency relationship, with
resultant non-liability on the part of the defendant.
J. P. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PRoTEcTION OF LAws-SuALL LoAN ComPAsiES. Plaintiff finance company brought an action to test the constitutionality of WASH. LAWS 1937, chap. 213, p. 1034, designed to regulate the activities of small loan companies. That act makes it a gross
misdemeanor to charge more than twelve per cent per annum simple
Interest on loans under three hundred dollars and exempts from its
operation any bank, trust company, building and loan association, credit
union, industrial loan company, licensed pawnbroker, one making casual
loans of his money, or retail merchant selling under conditional sales
contracts. Held: The statute is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a special act aimed at
a limited class, there being no warrant for so arbitrary a classification.
Aome Finance Co. v. Huse, 92 Wash. Dec. 92, 73 P. (2d) 341 (1937). Two
judges dissented.
There may be a denial of equal protection of the laws under the
Fourteenth Amendment when the classification made by the legislature
in the exercise of its police power is not reasonable. Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 66 L. ed. 254, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921). To be reasonable,
the classification need only show an inherent and substantial difference
germane to the subject and purpose of the legislation. State V. Cannon,
125 Wash. 515, 217 Pac. 18 (1923). The legislature may strike at the
evil where it is most felt, and the court should differ with it only where
the classification is palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. Radice v. New
York, 264 U. S. 292, 68 L. ed. 690, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924).
The exemption of banks and pawnbrokers from the operation of
statutes authorizing higher rates of interest on small loans has been
upheld over the objection of the bank that it was denied equal protection.
Family Finance Co. v. Allman, 174 Ga. 467, 163 S. E. 143 (1932); Cole v.
Franklin Plan Co., 176 Ga. 561, 168 S. E. 261 (1933). Likewise the
exemption of banks, auto finance companies, credit unions, building and
loan associations, and licensed pawnbrokers from statutes regulating
money lending and prohibiting high rates of interest on loans under
three hundred dollars has been upheld. Nat. Acct. Co. v. Dorman, 11
Fed. Sup. 872 (1935); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 77 U. S. 225, 56 L.
ed. 175, 32 Sup. Ct. 74 (1911); State v. Hill, 168 La. 761, 125 So. 317, 69
A. L. R. 574 (1929); State v. Tenn. Finance Co., 152 Tenn. 40, 269 S. W.
3 (1925). Some decisions upholding this classification have stated that
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small loan businesses are a distinct class of money lenders, inherently
different in nature from such as banks, and should accordingly be treated
in different ways. Koen v. State, 162 Tenn. 573, 39 S. W. (2d) 283 (1931);
State v. Hurlburt, 82 Conn. 232, 72 AtI. 1079 (1909). A classification
based on the length of time for which the loan is made and on the
difference between secured and unsecured loans has been held unreasonable. Wallace v. Zinnman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 Pac. 946, 62 A. L. R. 1341
(1927). But discrimination based on the size of the loan as well as on
the interest rate is proper in defining the crime of usury. State v.
Sherman, 18 Wyo. 169, 105 Pac. 299 (1909).
The decision of the Washington court can possibly be explained by
the fact that the governor's veto of certain important sections of the law,
including the licensing provision, substantially altered the act passed
by the legislature. Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion seems to be in
line with the great majority of decided cases.
S. C. S.
EASEMENTS-CREATION By IMPLICATION-SEVEEANCE OF OWNERSHIP. Defendant contracted to sell part of a tract of land to Sexauer who went
Into possession and thereafter built a driveway which encroached four
feet upon the property retained by defendant. This driveway was used
by both defendant and Sexauer, who assigned his interest under the
contract to plaintiff, who completed the payments and was given a deed
by defendant. Several years later, defendant commenced to build a
fence along the property line between the two tracts and plaintiff brought
this action for injunctive relief. Held: Injunction granted on the ground
that plaintiff had an implied easement over defendant's land. Hubbard
v. Grandquist, 91 Wash. Dec. 389, 71 P. (2d) 410 (1937).
The Washington court follows the strict view that in order that there
be an implied grant of an easement there must be first, a separation of
the title; second, that before the separation takes place the use which
gives rise to the easement shall have been so long continued and so
obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent; and
third, that the easement shall be necessary to the beneficial enjoyment
of the land granted or retained. Bailey v. Hennessey, 112 Wash. 45, 191
Pac. 863 (1920); Ashton v. Buell, 149 Wash. 494, 271 Pac. 591 (1928).
In the principal case defendant argued that severance of title took place
at the time the contract of sale was made, and since, at that time, the
driveway was not in existence, one of the elements which must be present
if an easement by implication was to arise was lacking. The court
answered this argument by holding that the severance of title occurred
at the time the deed was delivered. "The severance of title arose at the
time the appellants conveyed the property to respondents, pursuant to
the contract which respondents, as assignees of the original vendees,
had completely carried out. An ordinary contract for the sale of real
estate vests no title in the vendee. It cannot be held that the making
of such a contract, whereby the owner of a tract of land agrees to sell
a portion of it to another, severs the title." Hubbard v. Grandquist,
supra.
Generally, there is no dispute concerning the time of severance. The
cases are usually concerned with the question of whether at the time of
conveyance the quasi-easement was of an apparent, continuous, and
necessary character. Cogswell v. Cogswell, 81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 655
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(1914); Berlin v. Robbin, 180 Wash. 176, 38 P. (2d) 1047 (1934); Brown
v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 75 Atl. 382 (1909); Carman v. Dick, 170 N. C. 305,
87 S. E. 224 (1915); Dean v. Colt, 151 Ore. 331, 49 P. (2d) 362 (1935).
But, on principle, severance of title for the purpose of determining
whether or not there is an implied grant of an easement, may occur
as well at the time of the contract of sale as at the time conveyance
Is made. See note (1926) 24 MicE. L. REV. 315. For an easement is
implied on the theory that the parties intended that it should exist
and be included in the grant of the land. The courts merely declare in
effect that the particular circumstances of the transaction raise a presumption of such intention. 2 TnsAzY oN REAL PROPERTY, (2d ed. 1920)
p. 1273. The condition of the land at the time the contract was made
should certainly be a controlling circumstance in showing the intention
of the parties in this respect. Although there is a paucity of decisions
upon this point it has been held that severance of title takes place at
the time the contract of sale was made. In Toothe v. Bryce, 50 N. J. Eq.
589, 25 AtU. 182 (1892), it was held that plaintiff was entitled to an
easement which existed at the time of contract of sale but which had
been extinguished by the grantor before the deed was delivered. The
court said that the plaintiff was entitled to have the premises in the
condition in which they were at the time of contract as his right to
them vested at that date. See also Ananias v. Serenta, 275 Pa. 474, 119
Atl. 554 (1923). The result in the Toothe case, supra, was placed on the
ground that from the time of the contract of sale the vendee was the
beneficial owner of the premises, and that the execution of the deed
in pursuance to the contract was a ratification and adoption of the contract.
The decision in the instant case is explainable as an outgrowth of
Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925). Although that case
has been modified by later decisions, the Washington court has never
gone so far as to hold that the conditional vendee is beneficial owner
of the land, but merely, that he has "rights enforceable against the land
which Is the subject of the contract." Cuimback v. Stevens, 158 Wash.
675, 291 Pac. 705 (1930). But for Ashford v. Reese the Washington court,
In the instant case, would probably have reached the same result as in
the Toothe case.
R. A. H.
EVIDENcE-CoNFESSIONS-TALKING PxcTuREs. In a trial for murder a
sound moving picture had been shown which reproduced a confession
made by the defendant to certain police officers. Held: It was not error
to show the movie to the jury since a voluntary confession may be
properly received In evidence. People v. Hayes, 71 P. (2d) 321 (Cal.
App., 1937).
It Is well settled that a confession voluntarily given by a defendant
Is admissible. State v. Carpenter, 32 Wash. 254, 73 Pac. 357 (1903);
People v. Ford, 25 Cal. App. 388, 419, 143 Pac. 1075 (1914). However, the
confession, in order to be admissible, must not have been made under
duress. State v. McCullum, 18 Wash. 394, 51 Pac. 1044 (1897); People
v. Castro, 125 Cal. 521, 58 Pac. 133 (1899). It would seem, as pointed out
in the instant case, that the danger of duress is lessened where a confession is presented by talking pictures. The defendant is not very
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likely to be under duress at the time of an actual filming without its
being apparent in the reproduction, whereas a signature on a written
confession could be easily procured by threats or promises which did
not appear on the face of the signed instrument.
As to the general question of admissibility of talking pictures, it
would seem that logically they ought to be admitted. In essence, talking
pictures are nothing more than a synthesis of photographs and of
phonograph records, both of which have been held admissible in evidence
when properly verified. But like pictures and phonograph records, it
would seem that talking pictures should be used primarily to supplement,
clarify, and authenticate verbal testimony. The court in Commonwealth
v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1930) suggests this in parts of its
opinion. Even where proper use is made of talking pictures the novelty
of this type of evidence carries a danger that the jury will attach undue
weight to it. But as pointed out in a note in 78 U. oF PA. L. REv. 565
(1930), novelty soon wears off and, in the meantime, the danger of undue
prejudice may be corrected by proper judicial instruction.
In the instant case it is notable that all the objections of counsel
were aimed at general faults of moving picture confessions. It was not
contended that the particular sound picture did not give an accurate
portrayal of what took place. Instead, counsel contended, first, that the
movietone reproduction denied defendant the right to confront and to
cross-examine the witnesses against him. This objection was not considered by the court and it does not appear to have much merit. Inasmuch as witnesses must always be called to authenticate a photograph
or moving picture, the defendant then has the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses called. True, the actual story is told by the
film, which inanimate object is incapable of cross-examination, but the
same effect is achieved substantially by cross-examining the parties who
took the film.
Counsel also contended that the admission of a confession by movietone is hearsay evidence. The New York courts appear to have held on
occasion that moving pictures are hearsay evidence and that the testimony of witnesses at the scene is the only competent evidence. Feeney
v. Young, 191 N. Y. App. Div. 501, 181 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1920); Gibson v.
Gunn, 206 N. Y. App. Div. 465, 202 N. Y. Supp. 19 (1923). However, as
pointed out in Commonwealth v. Roller, supra, the reasoning in support
of this conclusion loses sight of certain principles underlying the admission of photographs and evidence of that character. In order to make
such evidence competent it must be shown that the picture is authentic.
When this appears to the satisfaction of the trial judge there is no
sound reason to prevent its acceptance in evidence.
The decision in the instant case shows a modern court drawing a
weapon for the discovery of truth from the domain of science. The
dangers inherent in the use of talking pictures are no greater than in
the use of the still photograph, the X-ray, the dictograph, the finger
print, the phonograph, or the miscroscope. In each case verification
and authentication is necessary to prevent imposition, but once the
verification is made, the mechanism is invaluable for the purpose of
discovering truth. A few cases have preceded the instant case in permitting the admission of talking pictures in evidence. Commonwealth
v. Roller, supra; Snyder v. American Car & F. Co., 322 Mo. 147, 14 S. W.
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(2d) 603 (1929); Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd. v. Paramount Film
Service, Ltd., Ch. 593, 604 (1934); Youssoupoff IV. Metro-Golcwyn-Mayer
Pictures, Ltd., 50 Times L. R. 581, 582, 99 A. L. R. 864 (1934). See also

nisi parius rulings collected In

WiGmoBE, EVIDENCE,

1934 Supp. pp. 338-40

and in note 4, p. 340. The instant case tends to strengthen the recent
trend shown in those cases.
W. C.1L
EVIDENCE-PRESENT RECOL

cTxON REVIVED-USE

OF COPIES.

In a per-

sonal Injury action the plaintiff's attending physician used a typewritten
copy of his office record book to aid him in testifying. An objection
on grounds that the original was available was overruled, the trial court
ruling as follows: "He is testifying from his own recollection as refreshed by the copy." (See Appellant's Brief 26599, p. 26). The appellate
court reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the sole ground
that the trial court erred in Its ruling as to the use of the copy, holding:
"The rule is that a record which the witness uses, when testifying,
to refresh his recollection, must be the original record, if that is procurable." 2 WIGmoHE ON EVIDENCE, § 749 is quoted as substantiating this
rule. Clausen et al. v. Jones et al., 91 Wash. Dec. 297, 71 P. (2d) 362
(1937).
However, this section of Professor Wigmore's treatise states a rule
as to the use of a copy where a "Past Recollection Recorded" is involved
which, as he points out, is an entirely different situation from one where
the witness refreshes his recollection. By a candid reading of the Clausen
case and according to the rulings made by both the trial and appellate
courts, quoted above, it seems clear that the latter situation is the one
involved in that opinion. Professor Wigmore deals with such a situation
in succeeding sections under the heading of "Present Recollection Revived" and therein says, "It is worthwhile, therefore, to note that none
of the rules just examined for past recollections recorded have anY
bearings on the present subject. The confounding of the two has led
to many misguided rulings." It is imperative, therefore, that the courts
distinguish between the two principles.
In the case of a past recollection recorded the witness testifies in
substance that he has no present recollection of the event under question
but that he had a recollection in the past which he recorded. This prior
recollection as embodied in the record or memorandum is offered as
evidence, and the witness' only function is to verify and authenticate it
by his testimony. However, in the case of a present recollection revived
the only purpose of the memorandum is to refresh or stimulate the
memory of the witness so that he can testify as a matter of independent
recollection. Here the spoken testimony of the witness is the evidence
and the memorandum forms no part of it and does not go in as evidence.
In the former situation the evidence is the memorandum as verified by
the witness; in the latter it is the testimony of the witness as refreshed
by the memorandum. See 2 WIGMOBE ON EVIDENCE, §§ 734-765. Substantially the same distinctions are made in 1 GEEENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, §§
436439, 29 R. C. L. 185, and in 4 PHILIPs ON EVIDENCE, pp. 726-736.
An examination of the local cases clearly indicates that the Washington court has recognized the above distinction. For cases dealing
with a past recollection recorded see State v. Douette, 31 Wash. 6, 71
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Pac. 556 (1903); Callihan v. Wash. Water Power Co., 27 Wash. 154, 67
Pac. 697 (1902); and Still v. Swanson, 175 Wash. 553, 27 P. (2d) 704
(1933). For cases involving a present recollection revived see Frair v.
Caswell, 79 Wash. 470, 140 Pac. 564 (1914); State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144,
81 Pac. 561 (1905); Kirkpatrick v. Collins, 95 Wash. 399, 163 Pac. 919
(1917); and Seattle v. Erickson, 99 Wash. 543, 169 Pac. 985 (1918).
As to the use of a copy when employing a past recollection recorded,
Professor Wigmore states (§ 749) that the original record itself must
be used if it is procurable. This rule seems but a typical application of
the Best Evidence rule and is almost universally followed. But where
a present recollection revived is employed Professor Wigmore states
(§ 760) a different rule: "Writing not Original, but a Copy. That the
paper is a copy, not an original, is also no essential fault. The only
question is whether in fact it is genuinely calculated to revive the
witness' recollection; and for this purpose a copy may conceivably be
entirely satisfactory. The radical difference of principle between this
use and that of a copied record of past recollection (ante, § 749) is
plain; there is here no necessity of accounting for the original in any
way." To this section are appended numerous authorities from England
and the United States in accord with the principle therein stated and
some additional and more recent ones will be found under the same
section number in the 1934 supplement to Professor Wigmore's work.
Four cases are cited as contra, but recent cases leave Illinois as the only
jurisdiction cited as being in the minority. Some of the more recent
cases in accord are Terry v. Amer. F. G. Assn., 3 Harr. 514 (Del.), 139
AtI. 259 (1927); Olmstead v. U. S., 19 Fed. (2d) 842 (1927); Fairfield V.
State, 155 Ga. 660, 118 S. E. 395 (1923); Taft v. bittle, 178 N. Y. 127, 70
N. E. 211 (1904); and Commonwealth v. Burton, 183 Mass. 461, 67 N. E.
419 (1903). See also a note in 98 Am. Dec. 619.
There are no previous cases in Washington raising the same point
as the Clausen case. However, there is dictum In one case, Seattle v.
Erickson, supra, which would lead one to believe that the Washington
court has accepted Professor Wigmore's view, namely, that a copy may
be used even though the original Is available where the purpose is to
refresh the recollection. In that case the court cited with approval a
statement by Lord Ellenborough in Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty 124, as follows:
"If upon looking at any document he can so far refresh his memory as
to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficient; and it makes no difference
that the memorandum is not written by himself, for it is not the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness." This
statement emphasizes that the primary concern is whether the memorandum will serve as a stimulant to refresh the memory. Rationally
a copy will serve that purpose as well as the original.
A good statement of the applicable rule and a recognition of the distinction pointed out above will be found in Jewett v. United States, 15
Fed. (2d) 955 (1926), where the court said, "It was one thing to awaken
a slumbering recollection of an event, but quite another to use a memorandum of a recollection, fresh when it was correctly recorded, but
presently beyond the power of the witness so to restore that it will
exist apart from the record. In the former case it is quite immaterial
by what means the memory is quickened; it may be a song, or a face,
or a newspaper item, or a writing of some character. It is sufficient
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that by some mental operation, however mysterious, the memory is stimulated to recall the event, for when so set in motion it functions quite
independently of the actuating cause."
The rule of the Clausen case is contrary to the overwhelming majority in the United States and England and seems to be principally
predicated upon a section of Professor Wigmore's treatise which deals
with a situation not applicable to the point in question. And because
that authority explicitly takes a different view from the one stated in
the opinion, it is apparent that the instant case will likely lead to confusion in the application of this very important principle of practice.
H.M.
TAxATiOx-INHEITANcEs-GrTs

IN

CONTEMPLATIOn

OF DEATH.

De-

cedent, thirteen months before his death, gave $6700 to his niece and her
husband, receiving in return a promise from the husband to pay the
decedent $134 a year for life. The decedent was in excellent health at
the time of the gift and died at the age of 74. Held: The gift was not
made In contemplation of death within the meaning of RE . REv. STAT.
§ 11201, and Is therefore not taxable. Contemplation of death means
"... an apprehension of death arising from some existing bodily condition or impending peril . . " In re Case's Estate, 91 Wash. Dec. 6,
70 P. (2d) 806 (1937).
Whether or not a gift was made in contemplation of death Is, of course,
purely a question of fact. The mere fact that the donor was very old
at the time of the gift will not be decisive. In re (arvill's Estate, 181
Wash. 627, 44 P. (2d) 768 (1935); In re Hrookes' Estate, 185 Wash. 294,
52 P. (2d) 307 (1936); In re Button's Estate, 190 Wash. 333, 67 P. (2d)
876 (1937). Age Is just another matter to be considered. The presence
or absence of other motives in making the gift will also have an Important bearing. Thus, gifts made to help out relatives In straightened
circumstances, and gifts made in consideration of valuable services
rendered previously, In re Brooke's Estate, supra, and gifts made to interest a nephew more deeply in the family business, In re Colman's
Estate, 187 Wash. 312, 60 P. (2d) 112 (1936), were held not taxable.
On the question of whether or not it Is essential to prove the existence,
at the time of the gift, of a bodily condition which gave rise to an
apprehension of death, there seems to be a slight difference of opinion.
The definition in the instant ease Is a quotation from 26 R. C. L. 225
which was first used by the Washington court in In re Carvill's Estate,
supra, and repeated in In re Culver's Estate, 185 Wash. 54, 53 P. (2d) 302
(1936), and is In accord with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions.
61 C. J. 1656; 75 A. L. R. 544. The language of the court, then, says that
existence of a "bodily condition" is an essential fact to -be proved. Inspection of the results reached in the Washington cases, though, indicates
otherwise. In In re Carsill's Estate, supra, the ease in which the definition In question was first used, the court proceeded to find the gift taxable, basing Its decision on a combination of factors to which it specifically referred, no one of which was an "apprehension of death arising
from an existing bodily condition." Even without that fact, the court
was able to find that the decedent "was anticipating a testamentary
disposition of a portion of his estate". Likewise, the gift in In re Button's Estate, supra, was held taxable primarily because the decedent
had given away everything she owned, that fact indicating that the
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transfer was testamentary in nature. And in two of the four remaining
cases on this question, in each of which the gift was found not taxable,
the court placed more emphasis on the fact that the gifts were not
testamentary in nature and on the presence of other motives, than on
the absence of "existing bodily conditions". In re Brookes' Estate, supra;
In re Colman's Estate, supra. In the latter case, for instance, the court
specifically said that "undue stress" was laid upon the physical condition of the decedent. In only two out of the six cases on this question
in Washington, then, did the court base its decision squarely on the
definition under discussion. In re Culver's Estate, supra; and the instant
case.
Thus, the results reached in the Washington cases indicate that the
rule In this jurisdiction, in effect, Is in accord with what might be called
the federal, or minority rule laid down by the United States Supreme
Court in U. S. v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446, 75 L. ed. 867, In spite
of the fact that both in the instant case and in the Culver case, the
court said that it was not bound by that case (which, however, it had
previously cited in support of its decisions in the Brookes and Colman
cases). In the Wells case, the United States Supreme Court expressly
disapproved the reasoning of the Court of Claims that there must be
an apprehension that death is "near at hand" arising from an existing
bodily condition, and said that the "thought of death" must be "the
impelling cause of the transfer", and that where the motive that Induced
the gift was of the sort that leads to a testamentary disposition, the gift
is taxable.
In other words, a consideration of all the Washington cases on this
question leads to the conclusion that the proper test is whether or not
the motive of the donor was testamentary in nature. If it was, the
gift will be taxable even though there be no proof of "an apprehension
of death arising from an existing bodily condition". If the evidence
indicates otherwise, the gift will be held not taxable, and the court
will very likely refer to the necessity of proof of an "existing bodily
condition" to bolster its decision and to relieve It of the necessity of
delving too deeply into the extremely difficult and vague question of the
state of mind of the donor.
M. K.

